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Surfactants are important corrosion inhibitors that are used in different applications. This paper utilizes the recently developed methodology and formulae to predict mild steel corrosion inhibition by alkyl pyridinium chloride and alkyl trimethyl ammonium bromide compounds. By utilizing different surfactants of varying chain lengths in different acidic media and determining the associated corrosion inhibition, the relationship between surfactant concentration, surfactant hydrocarbon chain length, surfactant critical micelle concentration, and corrosion inhibition can be evaluated. The results from this study can be used to improve relevant industrial uses of surfactants for corrosion inhibition.

To evaluate mild steel corrosion using a new surfactant‐inhibition model which was derived, in part, from the concept of intermolecular energy and molecular separation distance.

A Gamry potentiostat was used for polarization resistance tests to determine corrosion rate and the level of adsorption of surfactant at the solution‐metal interface was determined using UV‐spectroscopy. The relationship between inhibition and surfactant adsorption as well as metal corrosion was investigated using a traditional surfactant‐inhibition model, which assumes inhibition is directly proportional to surfactant coverage and new model.

The comparison of adsorption data and corrosion inhibition data shows inhibition was not directly proportional to physical coverage as assumed by the traditional inhibition model. Instead, it was found that coverage was related to inhibition through a power‐law dependency that is similar to that used to determine molecular interaction energies.

The new model was evaluated only for dodecyl pyridinium chloride mild steel system. The evaluation of the new model for various surfactant‐metal systems is suggested for future research.

The new model was found to more accurately predict the relationship between inhibition and coverage rather than traditional models for dodecyl pyridinium chloride‐mild steel system.

Aim of the present monograph is the economic analysis of the role of MNEs regarding globalisation and digital economy and in parallel there is a reference and examination of some legal aspects concerning MNEs, cyberspace and e‐commerce as the means of expression of the digital economy. The whole effort of the author is focused on the examination of various aspects of MNEs and their impact upon globalisation and vice versa and how and if we are moving towards a global digital economy.

In the last four years, since Volume I of this Bibliography first appeared, there has been an explosion of literature in all the main functional areas of business. This wealth of material poses problems for the researcher in management studies — and, of course, for the librarian: uncovering what has been written in any one area is not an easy task. This volume aims to help the librarian and the researcher overcome some of the immediate problems of identification of material. It is an annotated bibliography of management, drawing on the wide variety of literature produced by MCB University Press. Over the last four years, MCB University Press has produced an extensive range of books and serial publications covering most of the established and many of the developing areas of management. This volume, in conjunction with Volume I, provides a guide to all the material published so far.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

Communications regarding this column should be addressed to Mrs. Cheney, Peabody Library School, Nashville, Term. 37203. Mrs. Cheney does not sell the books listed here. They are available through normal trade sources. Mrs. Cheney, being a member of the editorial board of Pierian Press, will not review Pierian Press reference books in this column. Descriptions of Pierian Press reference books will be included elsewhere in this publication.

Through a survey of 200 employees working in five of the thirty establishments analysed in previous research about the microeconomic effects of reducing the working time (Cahier 25), the consequences on employees of such a reduction can be assessed; and relevant attitudes and aspirations better known.

An agency relationship exists whenever one party (the principal) delegates authority to another (the agent). Because agents are assumed to be self-interested and to possess goals that diverge from the principal's goals, the principal must expend resources (called agency costs) to insure that agents act in her interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In chains, the firm can choose as outlet managers either employees who are paid a salary (and perhaps a bonus) or franchisees who are granted the right to their outlet's profits after royalties and other expenses. In both cases, an agency problem is created because the firm delegates local decision-making to outlet managers whose interests are not perfectly aligned with that of the franchisor's (Rubin, 1978).

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.